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Credit Default Swaps and Firms’ Financing Policies 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on firms’ financing 
and trade credit policies. Our results indicate firms with CDS trading on their debt 
increase their equity issuances.  Further, firms with CDS trading on their debt and 
high levels of long-term debt issuances decrease their debt financing. Total and 
idiosyncratic risks are also higher for firms with CDS trading on their debt.  These 
firms pay their suppliers and collect from their customers quicker. Thus, the 
impacts of the CDS market are not limited to the borrowing firms but also affect 
economically connected firms. 
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1. Introduction  
Credit default swaps (CDS) allow creditors to hedge borrowing firms’ credit risk 
and have become a significant component of the U.S. financial markets.1 Yet this growth 
has not come without debate.  CDS and other derivatives have been called “financial 
weapons of mass destruction" and blamed for the 2008 financial crisis.2  Stulz (2010), 
however, concludes that CDS did not cause the credit crisis and that eliminating over-the-
counter trading of CDS could reduce social welfare.  The debate regarding CDS has 
prompted recent research to examine the impact of CDS on borrowing firms.  
Saretto and Tookes (2013) find CDS trading enables firms to hold more debt for 
longer time periods. This may be because banks are more likely to hedge safer 
borrowers’ loans with CDS (Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders, 2017). Subrahmanyam, 
Tang, and Wang (2016) argue the higher levels of debt resulting from CDS trading 
prompts some firms to increase their cash holdings.  However, even with higher cash 
holdings, firms with CDS trading on their debt have a higher cost of debt (Ashcraft and 
Santos, 2009) and greater likelihood of bankruptcy (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 
2014).  Additionally Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2017) find that the cost of capital 
increases while investment and firm value decrease for firms with CDS trading on their 
debt. The possible impacts of CDS trading on the firm’s financing decisions has received 
less attention in the literature.3 To this end, this paper examines the impacts of CDS 
                                                 
1 The CDS market grew from less than $2 trillion in 2002 to nearly $60 trillion by 2007 (Deutsche Bank, 
2009). The Deutsche Bank defines CDS as: “An agreement between two parties whereby one party pays the 
other a fixed coupon over a specified term. The other party makes no payment unless a specified credit 
event such as a default occurs, at which time a payment is made and the swap terminates.” 
2 2002 Berkshire Hathaway annual report (http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf) and 
Stout (2009). 
3 See Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2016) for a review of the CDS literature. 
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trading not only on the borrowing firm’s debt financing, but also their equity and trade 
credit financing decisions.     
We expect CDS trading to affect firms’ financing policies because capital supply 
frictions impact firms’ capital structure decisions. Specifically, access to capital markets 
is an important determinant of firms’ debt use and firms that can access to public debt 
markets use more debt (Faulkender and Petersen, 2005). Capital supply uncertainty 
increases firms’ probability of equity issuances while decreasing firms’ probability of 
debt issuances (Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang, 2013) and capital supply shocks lead firms to 
decrease net debt issue (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). Hence, debt capital supply side 
frictions have significant impacts on firms’ capital structure decisions. If capital 
suppliers’ hedging with CDS decreases capital supply frictions (Saretto and Tookes, 
2013) and increases supply of funds (Instefjord, 2005, and Hirtle, 2009), then CDS 
trading should impact firms’ debt and equity financing policies.  
In addition to debt and equity financing, firms often borrow from their suppliers 
or loan to their customers through extension of trade credit (Meltzer, 1960, and Murfin 
and Njoroge, 2015). Murfin and Njoroge (2015) state that trade payables were the second 
largest liabilities on the U.S. firms’ aggregate balance sheets in the year 2009. Given the 
importance of trade credit, we also study impact of CDS trading on firms’ trade credit 
policies. A firm’s ability to access credit from capital suppliers is an important factor in 
trade credit use (Petersen and Rajan, 1997, and Nilsen, 2002). If CDS trading reduces 
lenders’ exposure to borrowers’ credit risk, then CDS should allow borrowing firms 
easier access to credit markets. Accordingly, easier access to capital may decrease the 
borrowing firms’ need for trade credit.  
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Using a sample of U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2016, we find that CDS trading 
does affect firms’ financing policies. Specifically, we find that firms with CDS trading on 
their debt increase their net equity issuance. The increase in net equity issuance 
associated with CDS trading has important implications for the firms. Since the cost of 
equity capital is higher than the cost of debt capital, increasing equity financing will 
increase the cost of capital and decrease firm’s market value.4 We also find that CDS 
trading affects firms’ long-term debt policies, though this impact is non-linear. 
Specifically, for the firms with high (low) long-term debt issuances, CDS trading is 
negatively (positively) related to long-term debt issuances. The borrowers with the high 
long-term debt issuances and CDS trading on their debt may substitute equity financing 
for long-term debt financing. Our results are consistent with Ashcraft and Santos (2009) 
who find that CDS’s impact on firms’ cost of debt financing is non-linear. For risky and 
informally opaque firms, CDS trading increases the cost of debt but for other firms CDS 
trading does not lower the cost of debt. Our results imply that CDS trading has a direct 
impact on the firm’s long-term capital structure choices.  
Another important effect of these changes in capital structure choices is their 
impact on the firms’ risk profiles. Uncertainty in bond investors’ capital supply can lead 
firms to shift their investor bases from bond holders to equity holders and banks (Massa, 
Yasuda, and Zhang, 2013). Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) find that CDS 
trading increases the firm’s default risk and probability of credit downgrade which in turn 
may lead to an increase in bond investors’ uncertainty. Thus, increased equity issues 
associated with CDS trading can be a result of shifts in the firm’s investor base. Also, 
                                                 
4 Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2017) find that CDS trading is positively related to the increasing cost of 
capital and decreasing market value. 
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using CDS allows banks to approve more risky loans (Instefjord, 2005, and Hirtle, 2009) 
and the increased risk in the loans approved may lead to increasing borrower riskiness. 
We find that CDS trading is positively associated with the firm’s total risk and firm-
specific risk. Hence, CDS trading impacts firms’ capital structure choices as well as their 
risk profiles.  
Finally, we find that CDS trading does not affect firms’ short-term debt issuance 
policies but does impact firms’ accounts payable and accounts receivable ratios. 
Specifically, firms with CDS trading on their debt pay their accounts payable faster but 
also collect their accounts receivable faster. These findings extend the research regarding 
the impact of CDS on firms’ short-term liquidity. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2016) find that firms hold more cash after the inception of CDS trading on their debt, 
and that firms with greater financial expertise hold more cash when their debt is 
referenced by CDS. Our findings indicate that, in addition to cash holdings of the firms, 
CDS trading affects accounts receivable and accounts payable accounts. These results 
imply that the CDS market matters not only to the borrowing firms but also to the 
borrowing firms’ customers and suppliers. 
In addition to expanding the research about the CDS market, our study also 
contributes to the growing literature on the importance of customer and supplier link 
among firms. Large customers’ slower payments are associated with important 
expenditure cutbacks at the supplier level (Murfin and Njoroge, 2015). Return 
predictability takes place across economically related assets (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) 
and industry profits along supply chain are correlated (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010). Growth 
shocks to the customer firms are transmitted to supplier firms (Kelly, Lustig, and Van 
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Nieuwerburgh, 2013), and bankruptcy filings of customer firms affect their supplier firms 
(Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008). Related to these studies, our findings show that 
CDS trading affects firms’ accounts payable and accounts receivable policies. Since these 
accounts are important connections between customer and supplier firms, our findings 
indicate that CDS trading impacts not only the borrowing firms but also economically 
connected firms.  
2.0 Literature and hypothesis development 
2.1 Credit default swaps and financing decisions  
Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang (2013) study the impact of capital supply uncertainty 
on leverage and debt maturity. They find that capital supply uncertainty has a negative 
relation to the firm’s probability of issuing bonds and commercial paper, but has a 
positive effect on the firm’s probability of issuing equity and borrowing from banks. 
They suggest that the firm responds to an increase in capital supply uncertainty of its 
investor base by moving away from bonds into equity and bank loans. Also, Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010) find that firms’ debt issuance decreases with credit supply shocks but 
leverage ratios remain relatively stable.  
If CDS trading on borrowing firms’ debt decreases capital supply uncertainty, we 
expect borrowing firms to increase their net debt issuance and decrease their net equity 
issuances. On the other hand, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) find that CDS 
hedging of creditors increases borrowing firms’ likelihood of default and credit 
downgrade. Thus, it is also possible that borrowing firms issue less debt and prefer other 
financing methods such as equity issues. With these competing arguments, we test 
following competing hypotheses.         
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Hypothesis 1a:  Firms with CDS trading on their debt issue more long-term and short-
term debt but less equity.  
Hypothesis 1b:  Firms with CDS trading on their debt issue less long-term and short-term 
debt but more equity. 
2.2 Credit default swaps and trade credit financing  
While Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto and Tookes (2013) focus on impact 
of CDS on borrowers’ debt financing, lending by suppliers to their customers through 
extension of trade credit is an important source of financing (Meltzer, 1960, and Murfin 
and Njoroge, 2015). Financial constraints are one of the main reasons for firms’ trade 
credit use. For example, Meltzer (1960) argues when the suppliers faced with extension 
of credit terms, they either collect their receivables more aggressively or allow the 
average collection period to lengthen. Meltzer (1960) proposes that firms which 
accumulate liquidity in periods of easy money use that liquidity to provide trade credit 
during periods of tight money. Schwartz (1974) suggests that established firms use trade 
credit to help their younger customers’ growth. Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that small 
firms, with limited access to capital markets, use more trade credit when credit from 
financial institutions are unavailable, and firms with better access to credit offer more 
trade credit. Nilsen (2002) finds that small firms and large firms without bond ratings 
increase trade credit when banks decrease lending. Murfin and Njoroge (2015) find that 
small and young firms’ financial constraints and uncertainty about product quality are 
important factors of use of trade credit.  
If CDS can reduce lenders’ exposure to borrowers’ credit risk (e.g., Saretto and 
Tookes, 2013), CDS trading can allow borrowing firms to have an easier access to capital 
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markets. In that case, creditors’ CDS use can decrease borrowers’ trade credit demand. 
On the other hand, if CDS signal increasing default risk or credit downgrade 
(Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014), it will be more difficult for firms to obtain 
credit. The reduced access to capital will increase firms trade credit use. Given these 
conflicting views, we test the following competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2a:  Firms with CDS trading on their debt increase their trade credit. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Firms with CDS trading on their debt decrease their trade credit.  
 3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1 Data and Empirical Methodology    
Following the methods of Boehmer, Chava and Tookes (2015) and Saretto and 
Tookes (2013), we collect CDS data for the U.S. firms between 2002 and 2016 from 
Bloomberg.5 In any quarter, in which a CDS price is reported for a firm’s debt, we 
assume CDS are traded on that firm’s debt. All other financial data are from Compustat 
and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We delete firms with total assets 
less than $10 million and with negative market value of equity. Also, to avoid any outlier 
bias, we winsorize our variables at 1% and 99%. Our final sample has a total of 12,467 
firms, of which 1,597 firms have CDS traded on their debt at least one quarter during 
2002 to 2016.  
We closely follow Lemmon and Roberts (2010) to model the firms’ financing 
policies. To estimate impact of CDS trading on firms’ financing policies, we consider the 
following model:  
                                                 
5Though Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders (2017) document that CDS market existed since the early 
1990s, CDS quote data is first available in 2002 from Bloomberg. Further, CDS use increased significantly 
after 2003.    
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 ,_1 ititiititit XtradingCDSY                       (Eq. 1) 
where itY  is the net equity issuance, net long-term debt issuance or net short-term debt 
issuance for firm i  in quarter t . Net equity issuance is defined as sale of common and 
preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock scaled by start-of-period 
assets. Net long-term debt issuance is defined as long-term debt issuance minus long-
term debt reduction scaled by start-of-period assets. Net short-term debt issuance is 
defined as change in current debt scaled by start-of-period assets. We proxy CDS_trading 
with three different CDS proxies: CDS trading binary variable, CDS notional amount, 
and CDS bid-ask spread. CDS trading binary variable is an indicator variable equal to 
one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. CDS notional amount 
(in $100 billions) is the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all 
warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities displayed (as 
reported by Bloomberg). CDS bid-ask spread is calculated following Hasbrouck and 
Seppi (2001) as the CDS contract ask price minus CDS contract bid price.6 t and i  
represents year and firm-fixed effects. X is the vector of control variables, described 
below, which includes cash flows, market to book ratio, natural logarithm of sale, 
Altman’s Z-score, financial distress, term spread, corporate bond spread, and market 
return. 
We choose three proxies for CDS_trading since a possible concern in binary 
variable approach is that CDS firms could be different from non-CDS firms based on 
unobservable factors. To address this concern, we employ firm-fixed effects models, 
                                                 
6 Our bid and ask quotes are limited as they are reported by just contributing dealers. As Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) note the sampling of a small group of dealers should not be systematically related to the 
firms financing decisions. 
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which account for time-invariant differences between firms. We also completely avoid 
selection biases by focusing only on the CDS firm sample. Specifically, we focus on the 
notational (dollar) amount of CDS and the liquidity (bid-ask spread) of CDS trading on 
firms’ debt rather than the existence of CDS trading (a binary variable). Thus, the 
notional amount and bid-ask spread proxies are defined for only CDS firms and 
document the impact of CDS trading on financing policies of only those firms with CDS 
trading on their debt.7  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) argue the availability of internal funds 
affects firms’ financing decisions: firms with high cash flows have higher internal funds.  
Thus, we control for cash flows in our financing policy regressions. We define cash flows 
as income before extraordinary items scaled by book value of assets, as in Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010). Market-to-book (M/B) ratio is associated with growth prospects, thus we 
expect M/B to be related to firms’ financing decisions.8 Market-to-book ratio is defined 
as market value of equity plus total debt minus deferred tax and investment tax credits 
scaled by book value of assets. Since larger firms have lower asymmetric information and 
easier access to capital markets (Saretto and Tookes, 2013), we use the logarithm of total 
sales as a proxy for firm size. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) find that financial distress affects firms’ 
security issuance decisions. Thus, we control for financial distress with two proxies: 
Altman’s Z-score and a financial distress binary variable. Altman’s Z-score is defined as: 
[(3.3)(pre-tax income)+(sales)+(1.4)(retained earnings)+(1.2)(current assets – current 
                                                 
7 Our second approach is similar to those of Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Narayanan and Uzmanoglu 
(2017). 
8 If the market considers the firm to have poor growth prospects, the stock price is low and market-to-book 
ratio is low (Chan and Chen, 1991).  
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liabilities)   (book value of assets)]. The financial distress binary variable is equal to one 
if either i) the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) is less than its reported interest expense for the previous two years or, ii) 
EBITDA is less than 80% of its interest expense in the previous year. 
Market conditions are also important factors for firms’ financing decisions 
(Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). Specifically, timing of market conditions can affect firms’ 
security issue decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Hence, we control for market 
conditions with three proxies: term spread, corporate bond spread, and market return. We 
define term spread as yield spread between the 1- and 10-year Treasury bonds, corporate 
bond spread as yield spread between BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds, and equity 
market return as CRSP value-weighted return.  
To examine impact of CDS trading on firms’ risk, we estimate the following 
equation: 
 ,_1 ititiititit XtradingCDSY                       (Eq. 2) 
where itY  is firm  i ’s risk in quarter t . We use three different proxies for the firm’s risk: 
market risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk. Market risk is measured as the regression 
coefficient, 𝛽, in the following CAPM model estimated each quarter: ri,t − r f,t = αi,t + 𝛽 i,t 
× (rm,t − r f,t ) + u i,t , where ri,t is firm i’s daily stock return at time t, rm,t is CRSP value-
weighted market return, and rf ,t is the risk-free rate (1-month T-bill rate). Daily stock 
returns and market returns are obtained from the CRSP database. T-bill rate is obtained 
from the Federal Reserve (FED). Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the standard deviation of 
residuals from the quarterly CAPM regression. Total risk is calculated as the standard 
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deviation of the daily returns in that quarter for an individual firm.9 t , i , and 
CDS_trading are as previously defined. itX is a vector of control variables. We consider 
risk as a function of market-to-book ratio, size, z-score, term spread, market return, cash 
flows and financial distress. 10 Specifically, to control for impact of firms’ financial 
strength and growth opportunities on firms’ risk, we include cash flows and M/B ratio in 
our regressions. The impact of information asymmetry on firms’ risk is proxied using 
firm size measured as the logarithm of total sales.11 The potential for financial distress is 
proxied two ways: the firm’s Z-score and a distress binary variable.  Also, we control 
impact of market conditions on firms’ risk with three proxies: term spread, corporate 
bond spread, and market return. 
To estimate impact of CDS trading on firms’ trade credit policies, we follow 
Murfin and Njoroge (2015) and test following baseline specification:  
 ,) .log(__ 321 itititititit assetsTotflowsCashtradingCDSY    (Eq. 3) 
where itY  is accounts receivable and accounts payable ratios for firm i  in quarter t. 
Similar to Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Murfin and Njoroge (2015), we define accounts 
receivable ratio as trade accounts receivable scaled by sales, and accounts payable ratio 
as accounts payable scaled by cost of goods sold. t , i , and CDS_trading are as 
previously defined. Meltzer (1960) finds that financial constraints are important 
determinants of trade credit. Thus, we control for the impact of operating profitability on 
trade credit use with cash flows (as in Murfin and Njoroge, 2015). Petersen and Rajan 
                                                 
9 These proxies are calculated following Fung, Wen, and Zhang (2012). The Appendix provides calculation 
details. 
10 These variables are defined as in the equation 1.  
11 Saretto and Tookes (2013) argue that larger firms have lower asymmetric information and easier access 
to capital markets.   
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(1997) and Nilsen (2002) show small firms use more trade credit so we control for firm 
size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.   
The Appendix provides detailed definitions of all variables. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of our sample. Table 1 shows that during our sample period mean 
equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt issuances are positive. However, median 
value for all types of capital issuances are zero, and at 25th percentiles we observe 
negative values in all types of capital issuances. Thus, the firms’ financing policies vary 
during our sample period. Similarly, we observe high variations in firms’ trade credit use 
in our sample. The mean notional amount for CDS is around $4.63 billion, and average 
difference between CDS bid and ask prices is around $7. Our sample firms’ average 
market values are higher than their average book values and mean market return, term 
spread, and corporate bond spreads are all positive. While average total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk similar, the average market risk is higher than the other risk proxies.   
{Insert Table 1} 
4. Empirical findings  
4.1 Univariate comparisons 
Table 2 presents a univariate comparison of means and medians of firms with 
CDS trading on their debt (CDS firms) and firms without CDS trading on their debt (no-
CDS firms). Compared to no-CDS firms, CDS firms have lower equity, short-term debt, 
and long-term debt issuances on average. No-CDS firms’ mean trade credit use is higher 
than that of CDS firms. While no-CDS firms have higher market-to-book ratios, CDS 
firms are larger and have higher sales. No-CDS firms’ idiosyncratic and total risks are 
greater than those of CDS firms. This is consistent with the findings of Beyhaghi, 
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Massoud, and Saunders (2017) who find that banks are more likely to hedge safer 
borrowers’ loans with CDS and to sell riskier borrowers’ loans. On the other hand, CDS 
firms have higher market risk. All stated differences are statistically significant at 5% or 
better level. 
{Insert Table 2} 
4.2 Multivariate analysis  
4.2.a CDS trading and firm’s net equity issuance   
Table 3 presents estimation of the equation (1) and analyzes the impact of CDS 
trading on firms’ net equity issuances. In model 1, we proxy CDS trading with CDS 
trading binary variable that is defined for all firms in our sample. In models 2 and 3, we 
proxy CDS trading with CDS notional amount and bid-ask spread. The regressions 
include firm and year-fixed effects, the standard errors are clustered at firm level, and 
robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Table 3 model 1 indicates a positive relation between CDS trading and the firms’ 
net equity issuance. That is, firms that have CDS trading on their debt issue more equity 
than the firms without CDS on their debt. Model 2 shows that dollar amount of CDS 
traded on a firm’s debt also affects the firm’s equity issuance. Among the CDS firms as 
the notional amount of CDS increases so does firms’ net equity issuance. Model 3 shows 
that as the illiquidity of firms increases (bid-ask spread increases), CDS firms issue more 
equity. In other words, firms with CDS that are difficult to trade (i.e., CDS with low 
liquidity) on their debt issue more equity compared to other CDS firms. Our findings in 
Table 3 indicate that CDS trading has significant impacts on firms’ capital structures. 
{Insert Table 3} 
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The increased equity issuance associated with CDS trading has important 
implications for the firms. Since the cost of equity capital is higher than the cost of debt 
capital, increasing equity financing leads to an increase in the cost of capital. Our 
findings support the findings of Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2017) that CDS trading is 
positively associated with the increasing cost of capital.  
Increased equity issuance may also indicate that CDS firms shift their investor 
bases from debtholders to equity holders. According to Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang (2013) 
capital supply uncertainty of bond investors can lead firms to shift their investor bases 
from bondholders to equity holders and banks. Since CDS trading is associated with 
increased default risk and probability of credit downgrade (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and 
Wang, 2014), it is expected that CDS trading signals increased uncertainty for bond 
investors. Thus, our finding of increased equity issuance associated with CDS trading is 
consistent with view that CDS trading increases uncertainty for bond investors.  
In Table 3, we also find that cash flows are negatively related to net equity 
issuance. Consistent with market timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), market-
to-book ratio is positively related to net equity issuance. Firms with high sales issue less 
equity as do firms with higher risk (Z-score).  Financial distress binary variable, term 
spread, corporate bond spread, and market returns are also negatively associated with 
firms’ net equity issuance.     
4.2.b CDS trading and firm’s long-term and short-term debt issuances   
Next, we analyze the impact of CDS trading on firms’ net long-term and short-
term debt issuances. Again, we estimate equation (1) proxying for CDS trading with CDS 
trading binary variable, CDS notional amount, and CDS bid-ask spread. As reported 
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earlier, the regressions include firm and year-fixed effects, the standard errors are 
clustered at firm level, and robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. In Table 4 
model 1 shows that firms with CDS trading on their debt decrease their net long-term 
debt issuance. Interestingly, model 2 documents a positive relation between CDS notional 
amount and firms’ net long-term debt issuances. As shown in model 3, there is a 
statistically insignificant relation between CDS bid-ask spread and firms’ net long-term 
debt issuances. These findings imply that while existence and dollar amount of CDS 
trading on firms’ debt matter for long-term debt issuances, ease of CDS trading does not 
affect the long-term debt polices. To understand why the binary CDS variable and 
notional amount of CDS trading produce different results for net long-term debt issuance, 
we employ quantile regressions (QR).   
{Insert Table 4} 
Quantile regression (QR), developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), extends the 
regression model to conditional quantiles of the dependent variable, such as the 10th or 
90th percentiles. While the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates the mean of response 
variable conditional on explanatory variables, QR estimates the relation between 
independent variables and dependent variable, conditional on percentiles of dependent 
variable. QR’s flexibility for modeling data with heterogeneous conditional distributions 
is its main advantage over OLS. Also, QR makes no distributional assumption about the 
error term in the model. In short, QR examines how the relation between explanatory and 
response variables changes depending on the quantile of the response variable (Chen, 
2005).  
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Table 5 reports our simultaneous-quantile regressions over 10th, 20th, 80th and 90th 
percentiles.12 The quantile regressions find a positive (negative) and statistically 
significant relations between CDS trading and long-term debt issuances in low (high) 
percentiles. Thus, impact of CDS trading on net long-term debt issuance is non-linear. 
For the firms with low (high) net long-term debt issuances, CDS trading has a positive 
(negative) effect on net long-term debt issuance.  
At first glance, these findings seem to conflict with findings of Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) that firms increase their leverage and extend debt maturity with CDS 
trading on their debt. There are two reasons for our differing results.  First, Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) define leverage ratio as total debt divided by firm value. Since CDS 
introduction decreases firm value (Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2017), the leverage ratio 
can increase even if total debt remains same or decrease to a certain level. Second, an 
increase or decrease in debt issuance does not always imply an increase or decrease in 
leverage ratios. For example, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) find that firms’ debt issuance 
decreases with credit supply shocks but leverage ratios remain relatively stable. In 
addition, we also find that for some firms (lower net long-term debt issuance quantiles) 
CDS trading is positively associated with net long-term debt issuance.   
 {Insert Table 5} 
Overall, results in Table 3, 4, and 5 show that CDS trading is positively related to 
equity issuances but negatively related to long-term debt issuances for a subset of firms. 
CDS firms with high long-term debt issuances may substitute equity financing for long-
term debt financing. On the other hand, CDS firms with low long-term debt issuances 
increase both their long-term debt and equity financing. Accordingly, impact of CDS on 
                                                 
12 In our QR estimations, we obtain the robust t-statistics using bootstrapped standard errors.   
18 
 
debt capital supply frictions is not uniform across firms. Consistent with our findings, 
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that CDS’s impact on firms’ cost of debt financing is not 
linear. For risky and informally opaque firms CDS trading increase cost of debt 
financing, but not for other firms.   
In Table 6 we explore the relation between CDS trading and firms’ net short-term 
debt issuance. Models 1 and 2 find statistically insignificant relations between CDS 
trading proxies and firms’ net short-term debt issuance. However, model 3 documents 
that as the illiquidity of CDS increases, firms issue less short-term debt. The findings also 
show that cash flows are generally negatively related to net short-term debt issuance. 
Models also document a positive relation between corporate bond spread and net short-
term debt issuance. The generally insignificant findings in Table 6 indicate that CDS 
trading seems to be only important for the long-term financing policies of firms. 
{Insert Table 6} 
Our findings, so far, document that CDS trading affects firms’ long-term capital 
structure choices. One possible impact of changes in capital structure polices can be on 
firm’s risk profile. As a firm issues more debt and/or equity, the firm’s risk profile can 
change. We know CDS allow banks to approve riskier loans (Instefjord, 2005, and Hirtle, 
2009). The increased risk in the loans provided may lead CDS to increase the riskiness of 
the borrowers. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) find that credit risk of reference 
firm increases with CDS trading. Accordingly, it is possible that riskiness of firm may 
increase with CDS trading.  
In Table 7, we examine the possible impacts of CDS trading on firms’ risk 
profiles. Models 1 and 2 document positive and statistically significant relations between 
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CDS trading and firms’ total and idiosyncratic risks. CDS firms have higher total risk and 
firm-specific risk compared to no-CDS firms; however, the market risk of CDS firms 
(model 3) is not statistically different than that of no-CDS firms. Models 4 and 5 
document that among firms with CDS on their debt, as the notional amount of CDS 
increases so does the total and idiosyncratic risks of firms. Again, market risk is 
statistically insignificant in relation to CDS notional amount (model 6). Models 7, 8, and 
9 show that the liquidity of CDS trading matters for firms’ total, idiosyncratic, and 
market risks. Specifically, as the illiquidity of CDS increases, firms’ total, idiosyncratic, 
and market risk increase. Our findings in Table 7 document that CDS trading is positively 
associated with firms’ total risk and firm-specific risk supporting Subrahmanyam, Tang, 
and Wang (2014). Thus, CDS trading impacts not only the long-term debt and equity a 
CDS firm chooses but also the firm’s risk.   
{Insert Table 7}  
4.2.c CDS trading and firms’ trade credit uses 
Table 8 presents estimation of the equation (3) and analyzes impacts of CDS 
market on firms’ accounts payable and accounts receivable. Table 8 also reports the 
results from slope tests to examine if CDS trading impacts each component of trade credit 
differently. We follow the method suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and 
Piquero (1998) for our slope tests. The test-statistics are calculated using the following 
formula: 𝑍 = (𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑗)/(𝑆𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑗
2)1 2⁄ , where Coeff. is the estimated 
coefficient and SE is the corresponding standard error. 
{Insert Table 8} 
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Table 8 model 1 shows that CDS trading has a negative impact on firms’ accounts 
payable. Firms with CDS on their debt pay their accounts payable faster compared to 
firms with no CDS on their debt. Model 2 shows that CDS firms also collect their 
accounts receivable faster. These findings are consistent with Saretto and Tookes (2013) 
who suggest CDS trading will lead to less trade credit use.  Also, since some CDS firms 
decrease their long-term debt issue, they may collect their receivables faster to help their 
financing needs. In addition, the fact that CDS firms pay their accounts payable sooner 
may mean they need to collect their receivables faster. Thus, the CDS market appears to 
have far reaching implications not only for CDS firms, but also for the CDS firms’ 
customers.  
In model 3, we test if the impact of CDS trading on firms’ accounts payable is 
statistically different than that on firms’ accounts receivable. The slope test shows that 
the impact of CDS trading on firms’ accounts payable is greater than that on firms’ 
accounts receivable. Model 1 (2) shows a positive (negative) relation between cash flows 
and accounts payable (receivable), which is consistent with the trade credit patterns that 
Murfin and Njoroge (2015) examine. Specifically, even large and highly-rated firms with 
easy access to capital markets borrow though trade credit.13 Our finding implies that even 
the firms with high cash flows extend trade credit use by extending their accounts 
payable and reducing their account receivables.   
Table 8 models 4 and 5 proxy CDS trading with CDS notional amount. Model 4 
shows a positive relation between CDS notional amount and firms’ accounts payable 
ratio. Similarly, model 5 documents a positive relation between CDS notional amount 
and firms’ accounts receivable ratio. As the dollar amount of CDS traded on CDS firms’ 
                                                 
13Murfin and Njoroge (2015) examine causes and consequences of this pattern.  
21 
 
debt increases, so does the firms’ accounts payable and receivable ratios. The slope test 
(model 6) shows that the difference in impacts of CDS notional amount on both ratios is 
not statistically different from zero. Model 7 shows that as the liquidity of CDS on firms’ 
debt deteriorate, firms’ takes less time to pay their accounts payable. Model 8 finds a 
statistically insignificant relation between CDS’s liquidity and firms’ accounts receivable 
ratio. The slope test (model 9) find that the difference in impact of CDS liquidity on 
firms’ accounts payable and receivable ratios is statistically significant. These findings 
indicate that as the liquidity of CDS traded on firms’ debt deteriorates, firms tend to pay 
their accounts payable faster.  
In Table 9, we run QR over 10th, 20th, 80th and 90th percentiles to further 
investigate the different results for the CDS trading binary variable and CDS notional 
amount. Results indicate negative (positive) and statistically significant relations between 
dollar amount of CDS traded and accounts payable and receivable ratios for firms with 
low (high) levels of CDS notational amounts. Similar to long-term debt financing, the 
impact of CDS trading on firms’ trade credit use is non-linear. 
{Insert Table 9} 
4.4 2SLS approach 
A possible concern in our fixed effects approach is the introduction of CDS on 
borrower’s debt may not be exogenous. Creditors’ initiation of CDS on borrowers’ debt 
can be affected by the firm’s policies or firm’s market valuation. For example, if firm is 
taking on risky projects and/or market valuation of firm is decreasing, lenders can initiate 
CDS to protect themselves from increasing credit risk. So far our examinations have 
addressed endogeneity focusing only on CDS firms by employing CDS’ notional amount 
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and liquidity as proxies for CDS trading. In this section, we conduct a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) analysis for our full sample of CDS and no-CDS firms to address this 
possible concern of endogeneity.  
To conduct a 2SLS approach, first, we identify an instrumental variable (IV) that 
is related to creditor’s CDS trading but exogenous to firm’s financing policies. We utilize 
Bank foreign exchange derivatives as our IV similar to Saretto and Tookes (2013) and 
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014). Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) support 
using bank foreign exchange derivatives as the IV in their findings that a larger 
percentage of banks that are buyers of CDS protection also use interest-rate, foreign 
exchange, equity and commodity derivatives for hedging purposes. Thus, banks that are 
hedging one portion of their portfolios tend to hedge other components as well. Among 
these hedging derivatives, hedging with foreign exchange derivatives is least likely to be 
related to the borrowing firm’s market valuation, investment and financing policies. 
Using Thomson Reuters’ syndicated loan data, we identify banks that are book runners 
for firms’ syndicated loans.14 We then obtain the banks’ derivative positions from the 
Bank Regulatory Database. Bank foreign exchange derivative is defined as the average 
amount of the banks’ foreign exchange derivatives positions, used for hedging (not 
trading) purposes, relative to their total assets over the past five years.15  
Table 10 presents the 2SLS examination of the relation between CDS trading and 
firms’ financing decisions. Model 1 is the first stage of the 2SLS approach showing that 
our IV satisfies the relevance condition of 2SLS. Models 2, 3, and 4 present the 2SLS 
                                                 
14 For syndicated loans, book runners are the book managers that lead, originate, structure, and run the 
books on the deal. 
15 Saretto and Tookes (2013) report that mean of their IV is equal to 1.85% of total assets with standard 
deviation of 1.40%. Our IV’s mean is equal to 2.28% of total assets with standard deviation of 1.96%. The 
small difference may be caused by our larger sample size or longer time period.  
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examination of impact of CDS trading on firms’ net equity, net long-term debt, and net 
short-term debt issues. Model 2 finds that net equity issuance is positively related CDS 
trading. Models 3 and 4 find that net long-term and short-term debt issues are not affected 
by CDS trading. Similar to previous results, the 2SLS examination shows that CDS firms 
issue more equity than no-CDS firms. Interestingly CDS firms do not have significantly 
more or less net debt issuances than the no-CDS firms. 
{Insert Table 10} 
 Table 11 presents the 2SLS examination of the relation between firms’ trade 
credit use and CDS trading on their debt. Model 1 presents the first stage examination 
and finds that foreign exchange IV is statistically significant. The models 2 and 3 present 
the second stage of the 2SLS analysis. Models 2 and 3 find that CDS trading is positively 
related to firms’ accounts receivable and payable ratios. Again, we find that CDS firms 
collect and pay quicker than no-CDS firms. The slope test (model 4) finds no difference 
between the FX IV coefficients of models 2 and 3. 
{Insert Table 11} 
5. Conclusions 
Though the CDS market has grown dramatically in recent years, the role of the 
CDS market is still debated (Stout, 2009, and Stulz, 2010). Further, the literature is 
divided on whether the CDS market helps or hurts borrowing firms. Subrahmanyam, 
Tang, and Wang (2014) find increased bankruptcy risk for firms with the CDS traded on 
their debt even though some of these firms hold greater cash balances (Subrahmanyam, 
Tang, and Wang, 2016). Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find CDS trading increases some 
firms’ cost of debt, and Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2017) find that CDS trading 
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decreases firm value and investments, but increases the cost of capital. However, Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) find CDS trading reduces capital supply frictions and allows firms to 
hold more debt for longer periods of time. This paper adds to the literature by 
investigating the impact of the CDS market on firms’ financing decisions.  
Results indicate that CDS firms increase their net equity issuance. This is 
consistent with Narayanan and Uzmanoglu’s (2017) findings that CDS trading increases 
cost of capital and decreases market value. We also document a non-linear impact of 
CDS trading on firms’ long-term debt policies. For CDS firms with high (low) long-term 
issuances, CDS trading is negatively (positively) associated with long-term debt issuance. 
In addition, we document that CDS trading increases firms’ total risk and firm-specific 
risk. Thus, CDS trading impacts firms’ capital structure choices as well as their risk 
profiles. We also extend the literature by examining the impact of CDS trading on firms’ 
short-term liquidity. We show that, in addition to cash holdings of the firms, CDS trading 
affects impacts the firms’ trade credit. These findings imply that impacts of the CDS 
market are not limited to the borrowing firms but also affect economically connected 
firms.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table summarizes main descriptive statistics of our sample. Our analysis is based on 
quarterly data. Our sample consists of all U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2016. Our sample has 
total 12,467 firms, and 1,597 firms have CDS traded on their debt at least one quarter during our 
sample period. We filter firms with total assets less than $10 million and with negative market 
value of equity. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Detailed specifications of variable 
calculations are given in the Appendix. 
Variable Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std Dev N 
Net equity issue 0.0169 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0034 0.0925 298350 
LT debt issue 0.0094 -0.0065 0.0000 0.0059 0.0671 299563 
ST debt issue 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 0.0356 174308 
Acc. payable ratio 26.4655 0.3122 0.5626 1.2799 92.3272 335930 
Acc. receivable ratio 6.3775 0.4143 0.6536 1.0992 15.2336 334494 
Net trade credit 20.4026 -0.2942 0.0178 0.5791 82.1247 330959 
Notional amount ($ Bill.) 4.6332 0.0000 0.0000 4.9282 10.1613 48923 
CDS bid-ask 0.0742 0.0000 0.0466 0.0998 0.1152 62007 
Cash flows -0.0047 -0.0054 0.0044 0.0169 0.0541 341931 
M/B ratio 1.5458 0.7395 1.0986 1.8093 1.3794 263466 
Log(sales) 4.1550 2.5339 4.0985 5.7268 2.3472 341982 
Log(tot. assets) 6.3305 4.7350 6.2460 7.7444 2.1555 340511 
Z-score -0.2249 -0.3111 0.4981 1.1079 2.7319 257670 
Distress 0.2289 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4201 341982 
Term spread 1.8759 1.5400 2.0100 2.6900 1.0306 341983 
Corp. spread 1.1202 0.8900 0.9800 1.2500 0.4729 341983 
Market return 0.4232 -1.5039 1.0606 2.7941 4.1124 341921 
Idios. risk 0.0272 0.0142 0.0215 0.0330 0.0221 258559 
Total risk 0.0303 0.0167 0.0245 0.0366 0.0228 258559 
Market risk  0.9572 0.4882 0.9321 1.3730 0.9329 258641 
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Table 2: Univariate comparison of CDS and no-CDS firms 
This table summarizes comparison of means and medians of firms with CDS trading on their debt 
(CDS) and firms without CDS on their debt (no-CDS). Sample consists of all U.S. listed firms 
from 2002 to 2016. Statistical significance of mean differences is tested using t-tests, and those of 
medians are tested with Wilcoxon tests. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed specifications of variable calculations are given in 
the Appendix. 
 Variable No-CDS CDS Diff. mean No-CDS CDS Diff. median 
Net equity issuance 0.0190 -0.0018 0.0207*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LT debt issuance 0.0096 0.0078 0.0019*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ST debt issuance 0.0019 0.0005 0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Acc. paybl. ratio 28.6156 6.0012 22.6144*** 0.5640 0.5528 0.0111*** 
Acc. recvbl. ratio 6.7907 2.4446 4.3462*** 0.6596 0.5996 0.0600*** 
Net trade credit 22.1402 3.6801 18.4601*** 0.0164 0.0274 -0.0110*** 
Cash flows -0.0059 0.0064 -0.0123*** 0.0038 0.0092 -0.0054*** 
M/B ratio 1.5707 1.3076 0.2630*** 1.1075 1.0257 0.0819*** 
Log(sales) 3.8395 7.1082 -3.2687*** 3.8573 7.5412 -3.6839*** 
Log(tot. assets) 6.0422 9.0369 -2.9948*** 6.0435 9.3490 -3.3055*** 
Z-score -0.3002 0.4601 -0.7603*** 0.4677 0.6575 -0.1898*** 
Distress 0.2358 0.1640 0.0718*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Term spread 1.8871 1.7708 0.1162*** 2.0100 1.9300 0.0800*** 
Corp. spread 1.1182 1.1389 -0.0207*** 0.9800 0.9700 0.0100** 
Idios. risk 0.0282 0.0191 0.0092*** 0.0224 0.0148 0.0076*** 
Total risk 0.0311 0.0234 0.0078*** 0.0253 0.0185 0.0068*** 
Market risk  0.9422 1.0800 -0.1379*** 0.9169 1.0197 -0.1028*** 
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Table 3: CDS and net equity issuance - fixed effects regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of equation (1). In all regressions, the dependent 
variable is net equity issuance. Net equity issuance is defined as sale of common and preferred 
stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock, scaled by start-of-period assets. CDS 
trading is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the 
quarter. Notional values (in $100 billion) are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently 
sold) for all warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities displayed. 
Bid and ask spread is defined as CDS ask price minus CDS bid price. Definitions of control 
variables are in the Appendix. Sample consists of all US listed firms from 2002 to 2016. The 
regressions include firm and year-fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at firm level in all 
models and robust t-statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are used in our analysis. Symbols *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) 
CDS proxy CDS trading binary CDS notional amount CDS bid-ask  
CDS Proxy 0.0045*** 0.024** 0.014*** 
  (3.029) (2.356) (3.439) 
Cash Flows -0.0463*** -0.042 -0.033 
  (-5.194) (-1.434) (-1.322) 
M/B ratio 0.0160*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
  (22.589) (2.880) (3.515) 
Log(sales) -0.0133*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-13.972) (-3.201) (-3.329) 
Z-score 0.0039*** 0.005** 0.004** 
  (6.955) (2.030) (1.991) 
Distress -0.0020* -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.815) (-0.710) (-0.929) 
Term spread -0.0014*** -0.000 0.000 
  (-2.678) (-0.310) (0.199) 
Corp. spread -0.0013*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-2.729) (-2.856) (-3.549) 
Market ret. -0.0002*** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-4.020) (-1.435) (-0.758) 
Constant 0.0613*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 
  (13.966) (3.393) (3.421) 
Observations 211,158 23,411 29,498 
R-squared 0.0466 0.0783 0.0743 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES 
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Table 4: CDS and net long-term debt issuance -  fixed effects regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of equation (1). In all regressions, the dependent 
variable is net long-term debt issuance. Net long-term debt issuance is defined as long-term debt 
minus long-term debt reduction, scaled by start-of-period assets. CDS trading is an indicator 
variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. Notional 
values (in $100 billion) are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all 
warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities displayed. Bid and ask 
spread is defined as CDS ask price minus CDS bid price. Definitions of control variables are in 
the Appendix. Sample consists of all US listed firms from 2002 to 2016. The regressions include 
firm and year-fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at firm level in all models and robust t-
statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are used in our analysis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) 
CDS proxy CDS trading binary CDS notional amount CDS bid-ask 
CDS Proxy -0.0027* 0.028* -0.004 
  (-1.921) (1.753) (-0.674) 
Cash Flows -0.0612*** -0.043* -0.037* 
  (-10.758) (-1.841) (-1.840) 
M/B ratio -0.0007** -0.001 -0.001 
  (-2.529) (-1.016) (-1.128) 
Log(sales) 0.0039*** 0.004** 0.006*** 
  (7.805) (2.525) (3.451) 
Z-score 0.0016*** -0.000 -0.001 
  (6.521) (-0.315) (-0.719) 
Distress 0.0012* 0.001 0.001 
  (1.751) (0.616) (0.583) 
Term spread -0.0017*** -0.001 -0.001 
  (-4.572) (-0.633) (-0.898) 
Corp. spread 0.0017*** 0.001 0.002** 
  (4.028) (1.243) (2.278) 
Market ret. 0.0000 0.000** 0.000* 
  (0.165) (2.235) (1.723) 
Constant -0.0101*** -0.018* -0.028*** 
  (-4.160) (-1.692) (-2.671) 
Observations 216,111 24,055 30,297 
R-squared 0.0101 0.0098 0.0092 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES 
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Table 5: CDS and net long-term debt issuance -  simultaneous quantile regression 
This table presents the results from estimations of simultaneous quantile-regressions. In all 
regressions, the dependent variable is net long-term debt issuance. Net long-term debt issuance is 
defined as long-term debt minus long-term debt reduction, scaled by start-of-period assets. CDS 
proxy is binary variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the 
quarter. Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. Sample consists of all US listed 
firms from 2002 to 2016. The robust t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are obtained using 
bootstrapped standard errors. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 10th Quantile 20th Quantile 80th Quantile 90th Quantile 
CDS proxy 0.009*** 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.023*** 
 
(14.851) (9.722) (-6.288) (-15.578) 
Cash Flows -0.050*** -0.010*** -0.060*** -0.260*** 
 
(-8.861) (-4.770) (-20.614) (-15.085) 
M/B Ratio 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 
 
(21.886) (36.388) (-26.290) (-1.108) 
Log(sales) -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 
 
(-14.396) (-21.892) (56.702) (35.342) 
Z-score 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 
 
(17.696) (13.425) (-3.484) (-7.185) 
Distress 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 
 
(3.726) (7.006) (16.583) (13.715) 
Term spread -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.011*** 
 
(-10.827) (-12.144) (-17.093) (-16.492) 
Corp. spread 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** 
 
(0.355) (0.638) (-1.519) (-2.727) 
Market ret. 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.248) (0.992) (-6.492) (-5.481) 
Constant -0.029*** -0.009*** 0.007*** 0.051*** 
 
(-33.691) (-19.261) (14.154) (21.143) 
 Pseudo R2 0.0103 0.0076 0.0173 0.0173 
Observations 216,111 216,111 216,111 216,111 
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Table 6: CDS and net short-term debt issuance -  fixed effects regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of equation (1). In all regressions, the dependent 
variable is net short-term debt issuance. Net short-term debt issuance is defined as change in 
current debt scaled by start-of-period assets. CDS trading is an indicator variable equal to one if 
there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. Gross notional values (in $100 
billion) are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all Warehouse contracts in 
aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities displayed. Bid and ask spread is defined as 
CDS ask price minus CDS bid price.  Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. 
Sample consists of all US listed firms from 2002 to 2016. The regressions include firm and year-
fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at firm level in all models and robust t-statistics 
(reported in the parenthesis) are used in our analysis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) 
CDS proxy CDS trading binary CDS notional amount CDS bid-ask 
CDS Proxy -0.0000 -0.0029 -0.0060* 
  (-0.022) (-0.429) (-1.657) 
Cash Flows -0.0226*** -0.026 -0.031** 
  (-5.721) (-1.547) (-2.059) 
M/B ratio -0.0000 0.001* 0.001* 
  (-0.117) (1.876) (1.680) 
Log(sales) 0.0019*** 0.001 0.001 
  (5.313) (1.429) (1.209) 
Z-score -0.0001 -0.001** -0.001** 
  (-0.487) (-2.137) (-2.299) 
Distress 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
  (0.766) (0.887) (0.948) 
Term spread -0.0012*** -0.001 -0.000 
  (-4.337) (-0.960) (-0.717) 
Corp. spread 0.0015*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (4.353) (3.061) (3.254) 
Market ret. 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.981) (1.131) (1.061) 
Constant -0.0066*** -0.016** -0.013** 
  (-3.832) (-2.213) (-2.212) 
Observations 123,777 14,078 17,773 
R-squared 0.0064 0.0216 0.0195 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES 
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Table 7: CDS and firms’ risk profiles fixed effects regressions 
This table presents the results from estimations of the equation (2). In the models, dependent variables are total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and market 
risk. Total risk is the standard deviation of the daily returns for an individual firm. Market risk is the “beta” coefficient of the firm from CAPM 
model. The standard deviation of residuals from the CAPM regression represents the idiosyncratic risk. CDS trading is an indicator variable equal 
to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. Notional values (in $100 billion) are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or 
equivalently sold) for all Warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities displayed. Bid and ask spread is defined as 
CDS ask price minus CDS bid price. Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. Sample consists of all US listed firms from 2002 to 
2016. The regressions include firm and year-fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at firm level in all models and robust t-statistics (reported 
in the parenthesis) are used in our analysis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Total risk Idios. Risk Market risk Total risk Idios. Risk Market risk Total risk Idios. Risk Market risk 
CDS proxy CDS trading binary CDS notional amount CDS bid-ask 
CDS proxy 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.191 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.387*** 
 
(4.624) (4.883) (0.145) (5.526) (7.219) (1.293) (9.152) (10.701) (5.515) 
Cash flows -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.419*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.507** -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.378* 
 
(-11.329) (-13.166) (-4.659) (-3.515) (-4.650) (-2.188) (-3.193) (-4.263) (-1.925) 
M/B ratio -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.064*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.068*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.071*** 
 
(-13.276) (-12.984) (7.929) (-5.337) (-5.416) (5.630) (-5.012) (-5.173) (6.645) 
Log(sales) -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.066*** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.063*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.065*** 
 
(-5.966) (-4.673) (9.459) (-2.848) (-2.295) (3.481) (-2.460) (-2.130) (3.603) 
Z-score -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.031*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.020 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.019 
 
(-17.805) (-16.355) (8.351) (-5.595) (-5.394) (1.256) (-5.722) (-5.699) (1.529) 
Distress 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.019** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.025 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003 
 
(6.324) (6.199) (2.046) (4.529) (4.316) (1.187) (5.404) (4.922) (0.149) 
Term spread -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.050*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.019* -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.024*** 
 
(-16.878) (-30.881) (8.256) (-9.177) (-16.562) (1.848) (-7.389) (-15.151) (2.607) 
Market ret. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 
 
(8.134) (7.370) (4.271) (1.951) (1.441) (0.354) (2.049) (1.723) (0.063) 
Constant 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.287*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.328*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.308*** 
 
(63.088) (70.077) (8.723) (14.937) (16.301) (2.611) (14.980) (17.064) (2.635) 
Observations 171,016 171,016 171,072 22,826 22,826 22,832 28,808 28,808 28,815 
R-squared 0.1472 0.1772 0.0192 0.2120 0.2705 0.0283 0.2184 0.2802 0.0321 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8: CDS and trade credit use fixed effects regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of the equation (3). The dependent variables are accounts payable and accounts receivable ratios. 
Accounts payable ratio is calculated as accounts payable divided by cost of goods sold. Accounts receivable ratio is defined as trade accounts 
receivable divided by sales. CDS trading is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. Notional 
values (in $100 billion) are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single 
reference entities displayed. Bid and ask spread is defined as CDS ask price minus CDS bid price. Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. 
In our slope tests, we follow the methods suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998). We calculate the test-statistics with the 
following formula: 𝑍 = (𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑗)/(𝑆𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑗
2)1 2⁄ , where Coeff. is the estimated coefficient and SE is the corresponding standard error. 
Sample consists of all U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2016. The regressions include firm and year-fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at firm 
level in all models and robust t-statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are used in our analysis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Acc. paybl. 
Acc. 
recvbl. 
Difference 
 in Coeff. 
Acc. 
paybl. 
Acc. 
recvbl. 
Difference 
 in Coeff. Acc. paybl. 
Acc. 
recvbl. 
Difference 
 in Coeff. 
CDS proxy CDS trading binary CDS notional amount CDS bid-ask  
CDS Proxy -5.056*** -0.668*** -4.388*** 0.137* 0.028** 0.109 -3.128** -0.022 -3.105** 
 
(-5.574) (-5.894) (-4.800) (1.648) (2.455) (1.292) (-2.517) (-0.065) (-2.411) 
Cash flows 14.460*** -2.330***  0.634 -1.397**  -0.909 -1.977***  
 
(7.009) (-7.084)  (0.419) (-2.398)  (-0.733) (-3.136)  
Size -2.801*** 0.224***  -0.731 0.091  -1.178* -0.006  
 
(-4.663) (3.251)  (-1.164) (0.786)  (-1.830) (-0.061)  
Constant 30.899*** 3.942***  10.488** 1.460  14.785*** 2.561***  
 
(8.916) (9.624)  (2.089) (1.523)  (2.906) (3.069)  
Observations 335,913 334,477  38,087 37,915  48,983 48,941  
R-squared 0.0767 0.0251  0.0158 0.0142  0.0165 0.0122  
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
Clustered SE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
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Table 9: CDS and trade credit use simultaneous quantile regression 
This table presents the results from estimations of simultaneous quantile-regressions. In models 1-4 the dependent variables are accounts payable, 
and in models 5-8 dependent variables are accounts receivable ratios. Accounts payable ratio is calculated as accounts payable divided by cost of 
goods sold. Accounts receivable ratio is defined as trade accounts receivable divided by sales. CDS proxy is notional values (in $100 billion) that 
are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference entities 
displayed. Definitions of control variables are in the Appendix. Sample consists of all US listed firms from 2002 to 2016. The robust t-statistics 
(reported in parentheses) are obtained using bootstrapped standard errors. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 10th Quantile 20th Quantile 80th Quantile 90th Quantile 10th Quantile 20th Quantile 80th Quantile 90th Quantile 
CDS proxy -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.015*** 0.658*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.030*** 0.290*** 
 
(-3.815) (-3.453) (5.199) (8.677) (-4.101) (-2.732) (3.878) (47.884) 
Cash flows -0.071** -0.044 -3.368*** -7.757*** -0.611*** -0.721*** -3.566*** -8.840*** 
 
(-2.099) (-0.879) (-8.459) (-9.294) (-16.692) (-10.281) (-17.668) (-15.839) 
Size 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.115*** 0.298*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.071*** 0.477*** 
 
(24.949) (25.318) (32.274) (14.058) (12.079) (7.101) (31.704) (28.766) 
Constant -0.003 0.048*** 0.154*** -0.380*** 0.059*** 0.260*** 0.383*** -1.248*** 
 
(-0.404) (4.722) (7.180) (-3.398) (5.026) (21.123) (23.110) (-18.667) 
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.0018 0.0025 0.0193 0.0018 0.0008 0.0071 0.063 
Observations 38,087 38,087 38,087 38,087 37,915 37,915 37,915 37,915 
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Table 10: Financing policies 2SLS regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of two staged least squares (2SLS) for financing 
policy regressions. First stage is a logit specification, in which CDS trading is considered as 
dependent variable. CDS trading is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on 
the firm’s debt during the quarter. Bank foreign exchange derivative (IV) is defined as the 
average amount of foreign exchange derivatives of firms’ all lenders (Banks) use for hedging (not 
trading) purposes relative to their total assets over the past five years. In the second stage, we 
instrument CDS trading variable with foreign exchange derivative variable. Definitions of control 
variables are in the Appendix.  The regressions include year-fixed effects, standard errors 
clustered at firm level in all models, and robust t-statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are used in 
our analysis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
1st stage 
of  
2SLS 
2SLS 
Net equity 
issuance 
2SLS  
LT net debt 
issuance 
          2SLS  
ST net debt 
issuance  
FX IV 9.404*** 0.0314*** 0.0023 -0.0028 
 
(3.018) (4.375) (0.240) (-0.596) 
Cash flows 1.056 -0.0805** -0.0068 0.0263 
 
(0.639) (-2.151) (-0.150) (0.698) 
M/B ratio -0.0721 -0.0062*** 0.0044*** 0.0028*** 
 
(-1.068) (-3.794) (3.188) (2.947) 
Log(sales) 1.284*** -0.0117*** -0.0088*** 0.0008 
 
(22.69) (-8.070) (-4.568) (0.888) 
Z-score -0.372*** -0.0058*** -0.0012 -0.0004 
 
(-4.097) (-3.537) (-0.708) (-0.309) 
Distress -0.0410 0.0034 -0.0070* 0.0049* 
 
(-0.230) (1.003) (-1.658) (1.766) 
Term spread 0.0423 0.0029 -0.0066** 0.0036** 
 
(0.401) (1.368) (-2.050) (2.087) 
Corp. spread 0.0832 -0.0091*** 0.0046 0.0037 
 
(0.691) (-3.936) (1.082) (1.353) 
Market ret. -0.0038 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003 
 
(-0.394) (1.623) (-0.922) (1.231) 
Constant -12.50*** 0.0881*** 0.0676*** -0.0259*** 
 
(-19.58) (7.764) (4.080) (-2.878) 
Observations 8,214 7,484 7,615 3,775 
R-squared 0.3866 0.061 0.044 0.025 
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Table 11: Trade credit 2SLS regressions   
This table presents the results from estimations of two staged least squares for trade credit policy 
regressions. First stage is a logit specification, in which CDS trading is considered as dependent 
variable. CDS trading is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded CDS on the firm’s 
debt during the quarter. Bank foreign exchange derivative (IV) is defined as the average amount 
of foreign exchange derivatives of firms’ all lenders (Banks) use for hedging (not trading) 
purposes relative to their total assets over the past five years. In the second stage, we instrument 
CDS trading variable with foreign exchange derivative variable. Definitions of control variables 
are in the Appendix.  The year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors 
clustered at firm level in all models and robust t-statistics (reported in the parenthesis) are used in 
our analysis. In our slope tests, we follow the methods suggested by Paternoster, Brame, 
Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998). We calculate the test-statistics with the following formula: 𝑍 =
(𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑗)/(𝑆𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝑗
2)1 2⁄ , where Coeff. is the estimated coefficient and SE is the 
corresponding standard error. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
1st  
Stage of 2SLS 
2SLS  
Acc. payable 
2SLS  
Acc. receivable 
Difference 
 in Coeff. 
FX IV 6.421** 10.130** 2.709*** 7.425 
 
(2.389) (2.013) (3.688) (1.459) 
Cash flows 1.705 -14.79*** -7.688***  
 
(1.286) (-2.714) (-4.605)  
Size 1.090*** -0.244 0.0586  
 
(23.49) (-0.314) (0.818)  
Constant -12.94*** 3.354 0.610  
 
(-25.28) (0.574) (1.198)  
Observations 11,971 11,735 11,791  
Pseudo R-square16 0.3439    
  
                                                 
16 Since the sum of squared IV residuals (SRR) for IV can be larger than the total sum of squares of y 
(SST), the R-squared from IV estimation can be negative. Also, reporting R-squared for IV estimation is 
not very useful. The R-squared for IV estimation has no natural interpretation because when independent 
variables and error terms are correlate, we cannot decompose the variance of dependent variable. In 
addition, the R-squared for IV estimation cannot be used in the usual way to compute F tests of joint 
restrictions. If methods are intended to provide better estimates of the ceteris paribus effect of independent 
variables on dependent variable when explanatory variable and error terms are correlated; goodness-of-fit is 
not a factor (Wooldridge (page 501, 2012)). 
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Appendix  
Definition of the Variables 
 
Compustat data item numbers are reported in parentheses. All data is measured quarterly unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Variable Definition 
CDS trading 
CDS trading is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a traded 
CDS on the firm’s debt during the quarter. 
CDS notional amount 
The sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalently sold) for all 
warehouse contracts in aggregate, by sector or for single reference 
entities displayed. 
CDS bid-ask spread 
End of quarter CDS ask price minus end of quarter CDS bid price. 
CDS bid price is the price at which a buyer is prepared to buy 
according to the proposed outstanding contract. CDS ask price is the 
price at which a seller is ready to sell by the proposed contract. 
Net equity issue 
Sale of common and preferred stock (84) minus purchase of 
common and preferred stock (93) scaled by start-of-period assets 
(44). 
Net LT debt issue 
Long-term debt issuance (86) minus long-term debt reduction (92) 
scaled by start-of-period assets (44). 
Net ST debt issue Change in current debt (75) scaled by start-of-period assets (44). 
Acc. payable ratio Accounts payable (46) divided by cost of goods sold (30).  
Acc. receivable ratio 
 Accounts receivable (item RECTRQ or RECTQ (37) if RECTRQ is 
missing) divided by sales (2). 
Cash flow 
Income before extraordinary items (76), scaled by book value of 
assets (44). 
Corporate spread Yield spread between BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds. 
Financially distressed 
Financially distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if either i) 
the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) is less than 80% of its interest expense in 
the previous year or, ii) EBITDA is less than its reported interest 
expense for the previous two years. 
Market-to-book 
Market value of equity (61*14) plus total debt (51+45) minus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credits (52), scaled by book value 
of assets (44). 
Market return CRSP annual value-weighted return. 
Term spread Yield spread between the 1- and 10-year Treasury bonds. 
Z-score 
[(3.3)(pre-tax income)+(sales)+(1.4)(retained 
earnings)+(1.2)(current assets – current liabilities)   (book value of 
assets)]. 
Market risk (β) 
The regression coefficient, β, in the following quarterly CAPM 
model 
ri,t − r f,t = αi,t + βi,t × (rm,t − r f,t ) + u i,t , 
where ri,t is firm i’s daily return at time t, rm,t is CRSP value-
weighted market return, and rf ,t is the risk-free rate (1-month T-bill 
rate).   
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Idiosyncratic risk 
The standard deviation of residuals from the quarterly CAPM 
regression for β. 
Total risk 
The standard deviation of the daily returns measured quarterly for 
an individual firm. 
Bank Foreign 
Exchange Derivative 
(IV)  
The average amount of the banks’ foreign exchange derivatives 
positions, used for hedging (not trading) purposes, relative to their 
total assets over the past five years. 
 
 
 
